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1. Status Quo
After the refusal of President Voronin to sign Kozak Memorandum on the 26th of November 2003, the proc-
ess of negotiations was blocked. Afterwards, Russia attempted repeatedly to destabilize the situation by the 
means of Tiraspol separatist regime. To that end, which became traditional, were raised problems related 
either to schools or to the villages subordinate to Chişinău. On the other hand, after the Moldavian leader-
ship has suddenly changed its political orientation, it became more and more obvious that, involving in the 
Transnistrian conﬂict, Russia had exhausted  its possibilities to inﬂuence on the situation in the Republic of
Moldova. Moreover, the victory of Viktor Youshtchenko in presidential election held in Ukraine, as well as the 
pro-European and pro-NATO declarations of new Kiev administration have built an essentially new conjuncture 
in what concerns the Transnistrian conﬂict.
2. The Role and the Behaviour of Ukraine
 a) The Behaviour before Youshtchenko
Transnistria is an enclave between the territory under the control of Chişinău and Ukraine. Tiraspol separatist 
regime (the “transnistrian moldavian republic” - “tmr”) can survive from the economic point of view only if 
the Transnistrian segment of the Moldavian-Ukrainian state border (452 km) is open for economic entities of 
the “transnistrian moldavian republic”. Since the beginning of the conﬂict, Kiev administrations have promoted
a double standards policy in their relationship with the “transnistrian moldavian republic”. Such a behaviour 
could be ﬁrst of all explained by the corruption of the political elite and of state structures in Ukraine. On the
other hand, Ukraine has promoted in Transnistria a policy of competition with Russia, to the detriment of in-
terests of the Republic of Moldova.
Invoking false arguments, Kiev administration opposed to setting up joint Moldavian-Ukrainian custom points 
along the Transnistrian segment of the state border. Such a measure would have enabled Chişinău authorities 
to control goods trafﬁc to/from the “transnistrian moldavian republic”. Representatives of Tiraspol adminis-
tration use the airport of Odessa for travelling to Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has ex-
pressed its regret about the refusal of Chişinău to sign Kozak Memorandum. On the 1st of August 2004, with a 
view to overcome the crisis of the Transnistrian schools subordinate to the Moldavian authorities, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Moldova issued a resolution which stipulated that only the goods of economic entities 
of the “tmr” who paid taxes to the budget of the Republic of Moldova could cross the state border, including 
the one with Ukraine. On the other hand, Kiev administration categorically refused to impose such rules on 
the Transnistrian segment of the border. De facto, Kiev administrations treated the “transnistrian moldavian 
republic” as a real state which has the right to exist, including to conduct independently external economic 
activities, but which has two problems to be solved – normalisation of its relationship with Chişinău and lack 
of international recognition.
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 b) Youshtchenko Administration
It is obvious that Youshtchenko administration realizes the threat of corruption for the Ukrainian state and puts 
efforts to ﬁght against it, including against corruption caused by smuggling across the “tmr”. In the same time,
within Youshtchenko administration there is not unanimity concerning the attitude towards the “transnistrian 
moldavian republic”. According to some opinions, Piotr Poroshenko, Secretary of the Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine, has negotiated with Moscow the position of Ukraine concerning the Transnistrian conﬂict in
exchange for non-intervention of Russia in 2006 parliamentary election in Ukraine.
On the 22nd of April 2005, at GUUAM Summit held in Chişinău, Viktor Youshtchenko has brought in the “Seven 
Steps” Paper – an abridged version of the Ukrainian plan for the Transnistrian conﬂict settlement. Moldavian
authorities have been unpleasantly surprised by the fact that the version of the paper submitted by Viktor 
Youshtchenko was essentially different from the one examined by both parties the day before. Those “Seven 
Steps” were intended to lead to the legalization of the existing separatist regime, including of its paramilitary 
troops.
3. Leadership of the Republic of Moldova
On the 24th of March 2005, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted unanimously the Declaration 
concerning the Political Partnership aimed at Reaching the European Integration Objectives. The paper stipu-
lates among other the commitment of the deputies to solve the Transnistrian conﬂict within the frame of the
present Constitution by the means of the “urgent democratisation, demilitarisation and decriminalisation of 
the Transnistrian area”. Moldavian authorities focus their efforts on persuading Kiev administration to accept a 
partnership with Chişinău with a view to drive Tiraspol separatist regime to a tight corner and, in such a way, 
to bring the “transnistrian moldavian republic” back within the legal frame of the Republic of Moldova.
In the same time, being overwhelmed with concerns about the Transnistrian separatist regime, Moldavian 
leadership still fails to realize the need to promote a policy of “opening” the regime of the “transnistrian mol-
davian republic”, to start a dialogue with the population of the conﬂict area. Or, people of that area are sick
and tired of the state of uncertainty and more and more obvious dissension emerge in Transnistria between 
the regime of Igor Smirnov and various interest groups (local business, for example). The dialogue with the 
people of Transnistria would undoubtedly disturb the false unanimity in the “transnistrian moldavian republic” 
which allows the regime of Igor Smirnov to assume being only representative of the population of that area.
Moldavian authorities have not adopted yet an ofﬁcial position (a Law passed by the Parliament) towards the
frame-limit for the conﬂict settlement. The availability of such a position would have excluded any inadequate
and unacceptable for the Republic of Moldova external initiatives (“federalisation”, “seven steps”, etc.)
4. The European Union
The attitude of the European Union towards the Transnistrian conﬂict is ambiguous. On the one hand, the EU
is aware of the risks generated by the conﬂict and pleads for its urgent settlement. On the other hand, the
EU does not want the Transnistrian conﬂict to affect its relationship with Russia, overlooking the fact that this
conﬂict can be solved within the triangle European Union - Republic of Moldova - Ukraine and, consequently,
confrontation with Russia can be avoided without causing any frustration to it. Such an aim can be reached 
by the means of the joint efforts of the European Union, of the Republic of Moldova and of Ukraine, focused 
on the democratisation and the demilitarisation of the eastern area of the Republic of Moldova. As a result, 
the military presence of Russia would become an obvious for everybody nonsense, including for Kremlin ad-
ministration.
